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“A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design 
a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give 
orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a 
computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly.” 
- Robert A. Heinlein 
 
“There is no such thing as AGI.  
There may be such a thing as human-level AI.  
But human intelligence is nowhere near general.” 
 - Yann LeCun 
 
 
Abstract 
Terms Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and Human-Level Artificial Intelligence (HLAI) 
have been used interchangeably to refer to the Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research, 
creation of a machine capable of achieving goals in a wide range of environments. However, 
widespread implicit assumption of equivalence between capabilities of AGI and HLAI appears to 
be unjustified, as humans are not general intelligences. In this paper, we will prove this 
distinction.  
Keywords: Artificial General Intelligence, Human Intelligence, Narrow Artificial Intelligence.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Imagine that tomorrow a prominent technology company announces that they have successfully 
created an Artificial Intelligence (AI) and offers for you to test it out. You decide to start by 
testing developed AI for some very basic abilities such as multiplying 317 by 913, and 
memorizing your phone number. To your surprise, the system fails on both tasks. When you 
question the system’s creators, you are told that their AI is human-level artificial intelligence 
(HLAI) and as most people cannot perform those tasks neither can their AI. In fact, you are told, 
many people can’t even compute 13 x 17, or remember name of a person they just met, or 
recognize their coworker outside of the office, or name what they had for breakfast last 
Tuesday1. The list of such limitations is quite significant and is the subject of study in the field of 
Artificial Stupidity [41, 40]. 
 
Terms Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) [13] and Human-Level Artificial Intelligence 
(HLAI) [6] have been used interchangeably (see [5], or “(AGI) is the hypothetical intelligence of 
a machine that has the capacity to understand or learn any intellectual task that a human being 
can.” [1]) to refer to the Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research, creation of a machine 
capable of: achieving goals in a wide range of environments [23]. However, widespread implicit 
assumption of equivalence between capabilities of AGI and HLAI appears to be unjustified, as 
humans are not general intelligences. In this paper, we will prove this distinction.  
 
Others use slightly different nomenclature with respect to general intelligence, but arrive at 
similar conclusions. “Local generalization, or “robustness”: … “adaptation to known 
unknowns within a single task or well-defined set of tasks”. … Broad generalization, or 
“flexibility”: “adaptation to unknown unknowns across a broad category of related tasks”. 
…Extreme generalization: human-centric extreme generalization, which is the specific case 
where the scope considered is the space of tasks and domains that fit within the human 
experience. We … refer to “human-centric extreme generalization” as “generality”. Importantly, 
as we deliberately define generality here by using human cognition as a reference frame …, it is 
only “general” in a limited sense. … To this list, we could, theoretically, add one more entry: 
“universality”, which would extend “generality” beyond the scope of task domains relevant to 
humans, to any task that could be practically tackled within our universe (note that this is 
different from “any task at all” as understood in the assumptions of the No Free Lunch theorem 
[48, 47]).” [10]. 
   
2. Prior work 
We call some problems ‘easy’, because they come naturally to us like understanding speech or 
walking and we call other problems ‘hard’ like playing Go or violin, because those are not 
human universals and require a lot of talent and effort [50]. We ignore ‘impossible’ for humans 
to master domains, since we mostly don’t even know about them or see them as important. As 
LeCun puts it: “[W]e can't imagine tasks that are outside of our comprehension, right, so we 
think, we think we are general, because we're general of all the things that we can apprehend, but 
there is a huge world out there of things that we have no idea” [22]. Others, agree: “we might not 
even be aware of the type of cognitive abilities we score poorly on.” [4].  
 
This is most obvious in how we test for intelligence. For example, Turing Test [42], by 
definition, doesn’t test for universal general intelligence, only for human-level intelligence in 
human domains of expertise. Like a drunkard searching for his keys under the light because there 
it is easier to find them, we fall for the Streetlight effect observation bias only searching for 
intelligence in domains we can easily comprehend [56]. “The g factor, by definition, represents 
the single cognitive ability common to success across all intelligence tests, emerging from 
applying factor analysis to test results across a diversity of tests and individuals. But intelligence 
tests, by construction, only encompass tasks that humans can perform – tasks that are 
                                                          
1Some people could do that and more, for example 100,000 digits of π have been memorized using special 
mnemonics. 
immediately recognizable and understandable by humans (anthropocentric bias), since including 
tasks that humans couldn’t perform would be pointless. Further, psychometrics establishes 
measurement validity by demonstrating predictiveness with regard to activities that humans 
value (e.g. scholastic success): the very idea of a “valid” measure of intelligence only makes 
sense within the frame of reference of human values.” [10]. 
 
Moravec further elaborates the difference between future machines and humans: “Computers are 
universal machines, their potential extends uniformly over a boundless expanse of tasks. Human 
potentials, on the other hand, are strong in areas long important for survival, but weak in things 
far removed. Imagine a “landscape of human competence,” having lowlands with labels like 
“arithmetic” and “rote memorization,” foothills like “theorem proving” and “chess playing,” and 
high mountain peaks labeled “locomotion,” “hand-eye coordination” and “social interaction.” 
Advancing computer performance is like water slowly flooding the landscape. A half century 
ago it began to drown the lowlands, driving out human calculators and record clerks, but leaving 
most of us dry. Now the flood has reached the foothills, and our outposts there are contemplating 
retreat. We feel safe on our peaks, but, at the present rate, those too will be submerged within 
another half century.” [31]. 
 
Chollet writes: “How general is human intelligence? The No Free Lunch theorem [48, 47] 
teaches us that any two optimization algorithms (including human intelligence) are equivalent 
when their performance is averaged across every possible problem, i.e. algorithms should be 
tailored to their target problem in order to achieve better-than-random performance. However, 
what is meant in this context by “every possible problem” refers to a uniform distribution over 
problem space; the distribution of tasks that would be practically relevant to our universe (which, 
due to its choice of laws of physics, is a specialized environment) would not fit this definition. 
Thus we may ask: is the human g factor universal? Would it generalize to every possible task in 
the universe? … [T]his question is highly relevant when it comes to AI: if there is such a thing as 
universal intelligence, and if human intelligence is an implementation of it, then this algorithm of 
universal intelligence should be the end goal of our field, and reverse-engineering the human 
brain could be the shortest path to reach it. It would make our field close-ended: a riddle to be 
solved. If, on the other hand, human intelligence is a broad but ad-hoc cognitive ability that 
generalizes to human-relevant tasks but not much else, this implies that AI is an open-ended, 
fundamentally anthropocentric pursuit, tied to a specific scope of applicability.” [10]. 
 
Humans have general capability only in those human accessible domains and likewise artificial 
neural networks inspired by human brain architecture do unreasonably well in the same domains. 
Recent work by Tegmark et al. shows that deep neural networks would not perform as well in 
randomly generated domains as they do in those domains humans consider important, as they 
map well to physical properties of our universe. “We have shown that the success of deep and 
cheap (low-parameter-count) learning depends not only on mathematics but also on physics, 
which favors certain classes of exceptionally simple probability distributions that deep learning 
is uniquely suited to model. We argued that the success of shallow neural networks hinges on 
symmetry, locality, and polynomial log-probability in data from or inspired by the natural world, 
which favors sparse low-order polynomial Hamiltonians that can be efficiently approximated.” 
[25]. 
 
 3. Humans are not AGI 
An agent is general (universal [19]) if it can learn anything another agent can learn. We can think 
of a true AGI agent as a superset of all possible NAIs (including capacity to solve AI-Complete 
problems [55]). Some agents have limited domain generality, meaning they are general, but not 
in all possible domains. The number of domains in which they are general may still be 
Dedekind-infinite, but it is a strict subset of domains in which AGI is capable of learning. For an 
AGI it’s domain of performance is any efficiently learnable capability, while humans have a 
smaller subset of competence. Non-human animals in turn may have an even smaller repertoire 
of capabilities, but are nonetheless general in that subset. This means that humans can do things 
animals cannot and AGI will be able to do something no human can. If an AGI is restricted only 
to domains and capacity of human expertise, it is the same as HLAI.  
 
Humans are also not all in the same set, as some are capable of greater generality (G factor [20]) 
and can succeed in domains, in which others cannot. For example, only a tiny subset of all 
people is able to conduct cutting-edge research in quantum physics, implying differences in our 
general capabilities between theory and practice. While theoretical definition of general 
intelligence is easy to understand, its practical implementation remains uncertain. “LeCun argues 
that even self-supervised learning and learnings from neurobiology won’t be enough to achieve 
artificial general intelligence (AGI), or the hypothetical intelligence of a machine with the 
capacity to understand or learn from any task. That’s because intelligence — even human 
intelligence — is very specialized, he says. “AGI does not exist — there is no such thing as 
general intelligence,” said LeCun. “We can talk about rat-level intelligence, cat-level 
intelligence, dog-level intelligence, or human-level intelligence, but not artificial general 
intelligence.”” [46]. 
 
An agent is not an AGI equivalent if it could not learn something another agent could learn. 
Hence, we can divide all possible tasks into human learnable and those, which no human can 
learn, establishing that humans are not AGI equivalent. We already described ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ 
for humans problems, the third category of ‘impossible’ is what we would classify as abilities 
impossible for humans to learn efficiently [43]. Computer-unaided humans [7] do not possess 
capabilities in this category, to any degree, and are unlikely to be able to learn them. If 
performed by a human, they would be considered magical, but as Arthur Clarke has famously 
stated: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”  
 
Some current examples include: estimating face from speech [34], DNA [37] or ear [49], 
extracting passwords from typing sounds [38, 60], using lightbulbs [33] and hard drives [21] as 
microphones, communicating via heat emissions [16], or memory-write-generated 
electromagnetic signals [15], and predicting gender, age and smoking status from images of 
retinal fundus [35]. This is what is already possible with Narrow AI (NAI) today, AGI will be 
able to see patterns where humans see nothing but noise, invent technologies we never 
considered possible and discover laws of physics far above our understanding. Capabilities, we 
humans will never possess, because we are not general intelligences. Even humans armed with 
simple calculators are no match for such problems.  
 
LeCun gives an example of one task no human could learn: “So let me take a very specific 
example, it's not an example it's more like a quasi-mathematical demonstration, so you have 
about 1 million fibers coming out of one of your eyes, okay two million total, but let's talk about 
just one of them. It's 1 million nerve fibers in your optical nerve, let's imagine that they are 
binary so they can be active or inactive, so the input to your visual cortex is 1 million bits. Now, 
they connected to your brain in a particular way and your brain has connections that are kind of a 
little bit like a convolution net they are kind of local, you know, in the space and things like this. 
Now imagine I play a trick on you, it's a pretty nasty trick I admit, I cut your optical nerve and I 
put a device that makes a random permutation of all the nerve fibers. So now what comes to 
your, to your brain, is a fixed but random permutation of all the pixels, there's no way in hell that 
your visual cortex, even if I do this to you in infancy, will actually learn vision to the same level 
of quality that you can.” [22]. 
 
Chollet elaborates on the subject of human unlearnable tasks: “[H]uman intellect is not adapted 
for the large majority of conceivable tasks. This includes obvious categories of problems such as 
those requiring long-term planning beyond a few years, or requiring large working memory (e.g. 
multiplying 10-digit numbers). This also includes problems for which our innate cognitive priors 
are unadapted; … For instance, in the [Traveling Salesperson Problem] TSP, human performance 
degrades severely when inverting the goal from “finding the shortest path” to “finding the 
longest path” [29] – humans perform even worse in this case than one of the simplest possible 
heuristic: farthest neighbor construction. A particularly marked human bias is dimensional bias: 
humans … are effectively unable to handle 4D and higher. … Thus, … “general intelligence” is 
not a binary property which a system either possesses or lacks. It is a spectrum,” [10]. “Human 
physical capabilities can thus be said to be “general”, but only in a limited sense; when taking a 
broader view, humans reveal themselves to be extremely specialized, which is to be expected 
given the process through which they evolved.” [10]. “[W]e are born with priors about ourselves, 
about the world, and about how to learn, which determine what categories of skills we can 
acquire and what categories of problems we can solve.” [10]. 
 
If such tasks are in fact impossible for any human to perform, that proves that humans are not 
AGI equivalent. But, how do we know what a highly intelligent agent is capable of or more 
interestingly incapable of learning? How do we know what human’s can’t learn [61]? One trick 
we can use, is to estimate the processing speed [36] for an average human on a particular 
learning task and to show that even 120 years, a very optimistic longevity estimate for people, is 
not sufficient to complete learning that particular task, while much faster computer can do so in 
seconds. 
 
Generality can be domain limited or unlimited. Different animals, such as dolphins, elephants, 
mice, etc. and humans are all general in overlapping but not identical sets of domains. Humans 
are not a superset of all animal intelligences. There are some things animals can do that humans 
cannot and vice versa. For example, humans can’t learn to speak animal “languages” and animals 
can’t learn to play chess [53]. Only AGI is universal/general intelligence over all learnable 
domains. AGI is not just capable of anything a human can do; it is capable of learning anything 
that could be learned. It is a Superset of all NAIs and is equal in capability to Superintelligence.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
There is no shortage of definitions of intelligence [23, 24, 45, 18, 52], but we felt it was 
important to clarify that humans are neither fully general nor terminal point in the space of the 
possible minds [54]. As Chollet says: “We may even build systems with higher generalization 
power (as there is no a priori reason to assume human cognitive efficiency is an upper bound), or 
systems with a broader scope of application. Such systems would feature intelligence beyond 
that of humans.” [10]. Humans only have a subset of capabilities an AGI will have and the 
capability difference between us and AGI is far greater than capability difference between AGI 
and superintelligence (SAI). Bostrom describes three forms of superintelligence (p. 53-57) [8]): 
Speed SAI (like a faster human), Collective SAI (like a group of humans), and Quality SAI (does 
what humans can’t). All three can be accomplished by an AGI, so there is no difference between 
AGI and SAI, they are the same (HLAI ≤ AGI = SAI) and the common takeoff-speed debate [59] 
resolves to hard takeoff, from definitions. This implies even stronger limitations [57, 56, 58] on 
our capability to control AI and a more immediate faceoff. We are already having many 
problems with Ignorance Explosion [27, 28], an Intelligence Explosion [32, 26] will be well 
beyond our capabilities to control. 
 
If we use Legg’s definition of intelligence [23], and average performance across all possible 
problems, we can arrive at a somewhat controversial result that modern AI is already smarter 
than any human is. An individual human can only learn a small subset of domains and human 
capabilities can’t be trivially transferred between different humans to create a union function of 
all human capabilities, but that is, at least theoretically, possible for AI. Likewise, humans can’t 
emulate some computer algorithms, but computers can run any algorithm a human is using. 
Machines of 2020 can translate between hundreds of languages, win most games, generate art, 
write poetry and learn many tasks individual humans are not capable of learning. If we were to 
integrate all such abilities into a single AI agent it would on average outperform any person 
across all possible problem domains, but perhaps not humanity as a whole seen as a single agent. 
This may have been true for a number of years now, and is becoming more definitive every year. 
As an AI agent can be a superset of many algorithms from which it can choose it would not be a 
subject to the No Free Lunch (NFL) theorems [48, 47].  
 
While AI dominates humans in most domains of human interest [12, 14, 30, 39, 11, 44], there are 
domains in which humans would not even be able to meaningfully participate. This is similar to 
the Unpredictability [57] and Unexplainability/Incomprehensibility of AI [56] results, but at a 
meta-level. The implications for AI control and AI Safety and Security [51, 9, 2, 3] are not 
encouraging. To be dangerous AI doesn’t have to be general, it is sufficient for it to be superior 
to humans in a few strategic domains. If AI can learn a particular domain it will quickly go from 
Hypohuman to Hyperhuman performance [17]. Additionally, common proposal for merging of 
humanity with machines doesn’t seem to work as adding HLAI to AGI adds nothing to AGI, 
meaning in a cyborg agent human will become a useless bottleneck as AI becomes more 
advanced and the human will be eventually removed, if not explicitly at least implicitly from 
control. What does this paper tell us? Like the dark matter of the physical universe, the space of 
all problems is mostly unknown unknowns, and most people don’t know that and don’t even 
know that they don’t know it. To paraphrase the famous saying: “The more AI learns, the more I 
realize how much I don't know.” 
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